Posts (page 2)

Ursula Bernis gives in this scientific study an objective view of the problems the Tibetan exile community faces today.Her historical analyses are convincing and this text is a contribution to understanding the complex issues in Tibetan culture. Bringing an ancient civilisation in the modern world is a very difficult proces and since it tries to rescue its unique buddhist heritage of unique importance to all mankind.

Exiled from Exile

© by Ursula Bernis, 1996 - 1999

PREFACE

While gathering material for a book on seminal Buddhist masters of this century I became aware in 1996 that because most belonged to the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism and relied on the religious protector Dorje Shugden, they were suddenly at the center of a raging controversy. Told by the Dalai Lama to renounce ties with that venerable tradition they were put into a position of either breaking their vows or facing ostracism from the community. These greatest of masters who included one of the two tutors of the Dalai Lama had been central to the transmission of Buddhism as it traveled from Tibet to India and the rest of the world after 1959. They ensured the integrity of a living wisdom tradition that had been passed on from one adept to another for millennia. I was shocked to hear the ugly allegations against such venerated and highly respected Lamas. I personally knew many of them, had studied with them, and had had a chance to observe them in close proximity over many years. Like most everyone else, I found their gentle kindness, open-mindedness, and inclusive teachings exemplary.

Since every accusation against them contradicted facts, reason, and my own experience, I felt compelled to get to the bottom of the controversy that had generated such extreme views. It was impossible to continue my project without finding an explanation of how such a dramatic shift from the most revered masters to "devil worshipers" could have occurred and, moreover, how it could so completely possess the Tibetan cultural psyche in such a short time.

In the process of my work on this book I found that open debate about the subject was impossible in the exile community and that the conflict was driven by an emotional zeal for the Dalai Lama beyond all rational considerations, suggesting an identity crisis of unexpected proportions. The conditions of exile, the loss of country, home, family and the threat to the established religious world view certainly contributed to the Tibetans' exaggerated hold onto the one institution left to them, that of Dalai Lamas. However, there seemed something else at work that extended far beyond the Tibetan community to affect Western Tibet supporters as well. They exhibited similarly irrational responses to the conflict. No matter what approach one brought to the subject, all attempts at rational debate became immediately polarized and turned into a series of outlandish accusations none of which held up under scrutiny.

At the heart of the difficulties complicating this investigation were the unique problems deriving from the fact that Tibetan society remains largely an oral culture. I traveled throughout India and Nepal, the longest visit lasting four months, and talked to hundreds of Tibetans and affected Buddhists, gathering their stories and oral testimony. At the same time I collected relevant documentation of government records, published papers, wall posters -- a common form of communication about controversial subjects -- and circulars of the various social organizations that make up the Tibetan administration. This material forms the background for the book.

Since the Tibetan exile government denies the reality of the conflict it has been instrumental in creating, the issue is presented here from three different perspectives: Part I, from the point of view of Tibetans living in India and Nepal most affected by the conflict; Part II, a historical background and chronological ordering of events surrounding the conflict followed by biographical sketches of the most influential masters of a tradition now being suppressed as a "cult"; and Part III, which examines the issue from an outsider's point of view. My analysis traces some of the standard accusations to a basic confusion of religious and political issues. It brings to bear the historical and cultural background to show the dynamics of power relations in the exile community and how they get played out in the international arena through the media. Crucial to understanding the emotional involvement in this issue of Western Tibet supporters is their need to uphold at all cost today's icon of universal goodness, made accessible by the media to a world bereft of deep spiritual meaning. Even though the Dalai Lama's politics come into critical focus, the book is not intended as an attack on him.

Although I am indebted to many scholars and experts on the subject, it would be a disservice at the time of this writing to acknowledge their individual help publicly. The nature of the issue is so sensitive that they must remain unnamed. Even so, I would like to express here my gratitude for their contribution.

_____

"By defending those people who are persecuted for their race, religion, ethnicity or ideology, you are actually contributing to guiding our human family to peace, justice and dignity." Tibetan Bulletin, The Official Journal of the Tibetan Administration: "I Believe...", January-February 1999, p. 29.

His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama
Dharamsala, Dec. 7, 1998

INTRODUCTION

Never before in its history has Tibet been lost so thoroughly and seemingly irreversibly to invaders. Even during historical periods of strong outside influence such as the Mongolian and Manchu forces in the 17th and 18th centuries, For historical background, see chapters 5 and 6 of Tibetan Nation, by Warren W. Smith, Jr., Westview Press, Boulder, 1996; Tibet Survival in Question, by Pierre-Antoine Donnet, transl. by Tica Broch, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, chapter two. Tibet was not as totally occupied as it is now. Until Communist China subjugated Tibet in the middle of this century, it was never under complete control of another nation. This came at a time when the age of colonization had ended for the rest of the world, which makes this immense loss even more tragic. It would be difficult for any people to accept the sad reality of so much destruction and to deal with it rationally. Tibetans who grew up in a country as large as Europe, populated by not more than six million people, found the loss of their country and way of life especially hard to accept. Moving from the Himalayan snow mountain ranges -- and beyond them, the open spaces of the high plateau, which gave an intense sense of personal freedom -- to the stifling heat and congested spaces of overpopulated India with its religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity meant changing to a world as foreign as one can possibly imagine. Today, when the loss of Tibet is becoming ever more apparent to the rest of the world, the hope for Tibetan self-determination is quickly dwindling. Nevertheless, much of the generation growing up in exile courageously holds on to the idea of freedom, even if they see it as deferred to an indefinite future. To think through the many intrinsic contradictions that make up their political and social fabric in exile would only cause deeper suffering and more intense emotional turmoil. By their own accounts, most Tibetans simply rely on the Dalai Lama and go on with their everyday business of life. This attitude is not religious -- as is claimed in the West -- but a desperate solution to an identity crisis of a people in denial. It also explains their often unrealistic political views which are propagated in a larger international context.

The one Tibetan institution believed to be still intact is that of the Dalai Lama. In him religious and political power are fused in a uniquely Tibetan way. For an account of the uniqueness of the institution of the Dalai Lama and rule by incarnation, see for example, Rule by Incarnation, Tibetan Buddhism and its Role in Society and State, by Franz Michael, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982; Tibetan Nation, p. 107. Continuing the heritage through incarnation, the institution of Dalai Lama, first established in Tibet in 1642, For easily readable Tibetan historical background, see chapter 39, High Peaks, Pure Earth, Collected Writings on Tibetan History and Culture, by Hugh Richardson, Seriandia Publications, London, 1998; also Tibetan Nation, chapter 5; the Introduction in Secret Visions of the Fifth Dalai Lama, The Gold Manuscript in the Fournier Collection, Samten Gyaltsen Karmay, Serindia Publications, London, 1988; also "The Sovereign Power of the Fifth Dalai Lama: sPrul sku gZims-khang-gong-ma and the Removal of Governor Nor-bu" in Memoirs of the Research Department of The Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library) No. 53, Tokyo, 1995; also a brief discussion about the institution of reincarnate Lamas that became prominent in the political turmoil of the 17th century by E. Gene Smith in the introduction to The Autobiography of the First Panchen Lama blo-bzang-chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, edited and reproduced by Ngawang Gelek Demo, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series, Volume 12, Jayyed Press, Delhi, 1969. has become larger than life today in exile For a discussion of the view of the Dalai Lamas as absolute, which seems to be a modern phenomenon, see also A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951, The Demise of the Lamaist State, by Melvyn C. Goldstein, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1989. For example, "The current view of the Dalai Lamas is that each was "the absolute ruler of unchallenged authority" whom all Tibetans devoutly obeyed [as quoted from Michael 1982:51, derived from interviews in exile where Tibetans believe it applies to the Dalai Lama]. While this approaches accuracy for the last two decades of the 13th Dalai Lama's life (1913-1933), it is not generally true." p. 41. with the overwhelming responsibility of bringing an ancient culture into the twenty-first century. The institution of the Dalai Lama in exile has become the very soul of Tibet, the nation, the culture, and the religion. In the face of the severe disruption in Tibetan life not only by political forces but also global cultural change, it has become the source of Tibetan identity per se. No other Dalai Lama ever had to carry as heavy a burden of his institution as the current, the Fourteenth. In Tibet, the Dalai Lama was formally the "The Great Owner" Portrait of a Dalai Lama, The Life and Times of the Great Thirteenth, Sir Charles Bell, Wisdom Publications, London, 1987, p. 432. of the country, still one of his names today. In religious and political ways he was the head of the government and leader of his people. In exile, without a country and only a handful of people, without a legal mandate or a power base other than a globalized version of Buddhism, his tasks as head of state and government have become almost impossible. Yet he is everything to his people, the one true vestige of a cherished way of life that amounts to what is Tibetan for Tibetans.

Communist China took over Tibet beginning in 1949 with a so-called "peaceful liberation" culminating in complete control in 1959, when the Dalai Lama escaped to India See My Land and my People, Memoirs of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Potala Corporation, New York, Reprint 1977; see also the documentation of the CIA officer who trained the Tibetan Resistance (Chushi Gangdug) who ensured the Dalai Lama' safe escape, Tears of the Lotus, Accounts of Tibetan Resistance to the Chinese Invasion, 1950-1962, Roger E. McCarthy, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina, 1997. followed by approximately eighty thousand of his people, a number that subsequently increased to an estimated one hundred twenty thousand dispersed around the world. Then only in his early twenties, the Dalai Lama established an administration in exile with the help of his tutors, religious dignitaries, loyal old regime aristocrats, and family. Among the many books with details about the early exile days, see for example, Kundun, A Biography of the Family of the Dalai Lama, by Mary Craig, HarperCollins Publishers, London 1997; The Making of Modern Tibet, by A. Tom Grunfeld, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,New York, London, 1996, chapter ten. They established an infrastructure in Dharamsala, a small hill station in the foot hills of the Himalayas located in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, assigned to them by the Indian government, to deal with the influx of refugees and to save the largely religious culture of Tibet. Tibetans were granted refugee status in India at the time under an executive order, since India has not ratified the International Convention of Refugees. An instrument developed under the auspices of the United Nations to give legal status to refugees and guarantee their protection and rights. In spite of the political and legal reality that the Dalai Lama and his people are not permitted any political activities in India, their administration in Dharamsala is called a government. For more detail on the perception of the precarious legal position of Tibetans in India, see my interview with Samdhong Rinpoche, head of the assembly. It was formally established during the first few days of the Dalai Lama's escape in March 1959 in Tibet en route to India. Exile Tibetans consider it the Tibetan government per se even though neither India nor any other country recognizes it as such.

In the 1960's most of the older loyalists were pushed out of the Tibetan exile government in Dharamsala while the most important political functions were assumed by the Dalai Lama's family, According to Professor Dawa Norbu, Delhi, interview Oct. 24, 1997. particularly his older brother Gyalo Thondup. Chinese educated, he seemed to be the only diplomatically trained person then who could present the Tibet problem internationally. Gyalo Thondup had dealt with the Indian government already in 1948 when, unfortunate for its immediate political future, Tibet had failed to recognize Indian independence (1947). He also helped the Tibetan resistance with aid from the CIA. During the cold war, the CIA supported what they believed to be anti-Communist activities among Tibetan exiles. See, for example, John Kenneth Knaus: Orphans of the Cold War, BBS Public Affairs, New York, 1999. In Tibet, a family member of a Dalai Lama was legally barred from holding office, something that changed in exile, where Gyalo Thondup and others later became ministers. This occurred only in the 1990's, when ministers were elected rather than appointed. Much controversy surrounds Gyalo Thondup whom Tibetans believe to be the main architect of the Dalai Lama's plan to integrate Tibet into China under increased cultural autonomy. For some of the many, even violent confrontations surrounding him over the years, see for example, Jamyang Norbu: "The Heart of the Matter," Tibetan Review, March 1994. Recently, another brother of the Dalai Lama has claimed that today only three families, including his, run the exile government. "...the Tibetan exile government is run by three families, one of which is mine [i.e. the Dalai Lama's or the Yabshi family]..." in an unpublished letter of resignation by Professor Thubten Jigme Norbu, the Dalai Lama's brother, from post as Representative of the Tibetan exile government to Asia (Tokyo) to the Cabinet (Kashag), dated Feb. 6, 1992, with copy to Private Office, the Assembly, the foreign minister and the Tibetan Youth Congress, p. 9-10.

Early on in exile, in 1961, the Dalai Lama began to draft a constitution for a future free Tibet which was adopted in 1963. However, a charter to administer the very different situation in exile was not implemented until 1991. For an outline of the structure see, for example, Tibetan Parliament in Exile, published by Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre (TPPRC) in co-operation with Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation, New Delhi, 1996; The Making of Modern Tibet, chapter 12; also see the interview with Samdhong Rinpoche, head of the Assembly and co-drafter of the charter, below, in "Exiled from Exile." It is a simpler document than the draft constitution and it passed the Assembly of People's Deputies by a simple majority. Hailed as a "leap forward" in democratizing Tibetan politics, Tibetan Parliament in Exile, p. 16. it instituted several novel practices for the exile government such as election of ministers (Tib.: kalon) by the people's deputies in their Assembly or parliament. Nevertheless, the preamble states the nature of the government to be the union of religious and political affairs in continuity with the Ganden Potang government of Tibet established by the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1642. The Dalai Lama continues to be its unelected head and the political system remains without institutionalized opposition.

It is commonly known that the Dalai Lama is still the religious and political head of Tibetans, at least in exile, since in the Western press he is usually referred to as "God-King." The effort to democratize has not extended to separate the domains of religion and politics. Since the Tibetan exile government in Dharamsala is not legitimately a government by legal and international standards, it is difficult to analyze this problematic in an easy or straightforward way. Democratic it is not. The Tibetan people have never been asked to vote on any of the major political decisions concerning the future of their country either inside or outside Tibet. The confusing and much discussed referendum of 1995-7 was never put to a vote. People realized they had no real choice and decided to follow the Dalai Lama's choice, which had already been confirmed by the State Oracle. More detail, see Part II. Often not even the Assembly and Cabinet (Kashag) are asked. Even more basic, freedom of speech, the very foundation of democratic striving, is woefully absent among exile Tibetans. Criticism of official exile government business is usually dismissed as being of Chinese origin. This practice has a long history. It was even said of Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's brother, when in 1948 he tried to make clear to the Tibetan government in Lhasa what was in store for them after having escaped to India from the Communist onslaught in Shanghai where he was studying. At the time, India offered help to Tibet but the government in Lhasa did not answer Gyalo Thondup's pleas because they believed he was working for the Chinese. See Kundun, page 250 China is doing whatever it can to destabilize the exile community, discredit the Dalai Lama worldwide, and silence any criticism of its policies in Tibet. See for example, The Anguish of Tibet, edited by Petra K. Kelly, Gert Bastian, and Pat Aiello, Parallax Press, Berkeley, 1991; Cutting off the Serpent's Head, Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995, Tibet Information Network and Human Rights Watch, New York, 1996; Tsering Shakya: The Dragon in the Land of Snows, Pimlico, London, 1999. It moves to fan the flames of any internal Tibetan conflict. But Tibetan society today seems to be just as intolerant of internal opposition as the Chinese. Allegations of Chinese interference are widely used by Tibetans as an excuse to silence any opposition. Jamyang Norbu: "Opening of the Political Eye, Tibet's long search for democracy," Tibetan Review, November 1990

In an atmosphere where nationalistic and religious fervor for the Dalai Lama are all too often substituted for reasoned debate and political analysis, the dynamics of social groups plays an important role in enforcing policies of the exile government, which itself is denied this role by its host country. The unusual circumstances of exile require atypical solutions to social and political problems. The exile government works through a social organizations which were also common in old Tibet where they did not have the same political functions they acquired in exile. In 1991, the base of representation in the Assembly was divided into regional groups (based on the traditional division of Tibetan geography into three main provinces, Tib.: chol.ka gsum,or Cholsum) and religious sects functioning like interest groups. A network of NGO's, Many of them were started by someone prominent in the exile government, as the Women's Association was started in the 1980 by request of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and the Tibetan Youth Congress originally upon request of Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's brother, with founding members listed in the TYC brochure as Tenzin Geyche Tethong, Lodi Gyari, Sonam Topgyal and Tenzin N. Tethong, almost all of whom are still powerful players in the Tibetan exile government. made up of different regional sub-groups, social welfare groups, religious organizations, and local chapters of women's and youth groups effectively carry out the exile government's wishes usually in the name of the Dalai Lama. For some of the underlying political dynamics in exile, see, for example, Illusion and Reality, Jamyang Norbu, TYC Books, Dharamsala, 1989. "Thomas Merton, the Catholic divine, once observed that nowhere in the world was a leader so loved by his people as the Dalai Lama. It should be the task of government officials to strengthen this bond of affection and loyalty and direct it towards the achievement of our common goal; not pervert it to blackmailing the people into silence. The Chinese are doing their best to turn us into a nation of sheep; it is heartbreaking that the Tibetan government should be attempting to hasten the process." p. 37 Social pressure to conform to anything interpreted as the wish of the Dalai Lama has become intense, especially in the last decade. This type of social control was not exercised in Tibet before 1959 but developed out of the very difficult conditions in exile, where the large number of social groups originated first to help destitute refugees and later to raise funds from international sponsors and donor organizations. Another reason is that the legal status of Tibetans in India is precarious. They are prohibited from engaging in overt "political" activity. Since Tibetans are refugees in India, they do not have their own police or legal system. The Indian police and legal systems have often proven to be corrupt and Tibetans do not trust them. Thus, social pressure is an effective method of control and enforcing directives of the Tibetan exile government. Tibetans are clannish in ways difficult for us to grasp which makes social pressure an effective device. They are primarily still an oral culture and get their information from radio, tapes, and an amazingly accurate grapevine. This makes them extremely vulnerable to rumor mongering. Publications in Tibetan or English are to varying degrees controlled by the exile government which exercises censorship. Jamyang Norbu: "Opening of the Political Eye, Tibet's long search for democracy," Tibetan Review, November 1990 A free press does not exist among Tibetans themselves, although they have access to the international press. The fear and mistrust that naturally develop among exiles are ever on the rise. This is especially true since more and more Tibetans escaped to India from their Chinese controlled homeland in the 1990's, For example, the monk population in the big Gelugpa monastic universities, Ganden, Drepung, and Sera doubled in the 90's with an influx of people coming out of Tibet, where religious freedom had increased but the opportunity for thorough Buddhist studies was not available. Tibetan Buddhism has many different sub-sects, but generally four major ones are given: Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Gelugpa, in order of historical emergence. The Gelugpa order has been the largest group since the 16th- 17th centuries. They focus more on monastic institutions than the other groups and on philosophical studies that culminate in the Geshe degree. bringing with them their different use of language and unfamiliar views. The upbringing of Tibetans in Tibet and those in India differs radically, causing even deeper factionalism and paranoia already rampant in the exile community. These factors explain in part why the Dalai Lama's words carry the weight of law and why an indirect remark from him can destroy someone or actually become incendiary.

Until the 1990's the one issue uniting the exile community had been Tibetan independence. The State Oracle advising the Dalai Lama and his government had repeatedly predicted in the 80's early 90's that freedom was waiting just around the corner. For example, at the Kalachakra initiation His Holiness gave at Varanasi in 1983, he mentioned that Tibetans would regain freedom soon, as soon as five and no longer than ten years. This clearly did not materialize. With the official political strategy having changed from independence to returning to Tibet under Chinese control, The Dalai Lama has repeated this in the world press especially since the fall of 1997. Most recently several high ranking members of his exile government confirmed to the international press that the Dalai Lama was even willing to make a public statement in Washington (Nov. 7-10, 1998) admitting Tibet and Taiwan are part of China because the Chinese stated this as a condition for his visit to China. See, for example, the German newspaper "Die Woche," November 6, 1998. the institution of Dalai Lama has emerged today as the only unifying factor. Where in the 1980's the Dalai Lama still laughingly responded in the affirmative to the inevitable journalistic question whether he was the last Dalai Lama, in the 90's he answered the same question by emphasizing different type of continuity for the institution. Among the possibilities he mentioned were a Dalai Lama elected like the Pope or incarnated as a woman. The return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet became the most important issue for exile Tibetans in the late 1990's. According to the head of the Tibetan assembly, Samdhong Rinpoche, in an interview January 12, 1998 in Sarnath. The reason: the Chinese would never accept a Dalai Lama born outside Tibet. However, there are contradictory statements on the issue of the Dalai Lama's rebirth. "The Dalai Lama used the occasion of his 64th birthday on Tuesday to announce he will not be reincarnated in Tibet, but in a free country outside Chinese control..." "Dalai Lama Discusses His Rebirth," Associated Press, New Delhi, AOL July 6, 1999. See also, Dexter Filkins, "Tibetans Tire of Peaceful 'Middle Way," Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1999, "If I die, and the Tibetan people want another Dalai Lama, that person will appear in the refugee community, outside of Tibet." The same article also quotes the Dalai Lama as saying, "After I die this is not my responsibility, ... let someone else worry about it." While the Chinese view is, "When the Dalai Lama dies, he dies," said Mr. Ma Chongying, the deputy director of the Minority and Religious Affairs Bureau in Tibet. "There will be no replacement." Reporting from Lhasa, Seth Faison: "As Dalai Lama Woos Beijing, Tibetans Pray for His Return," The New York Times, November 9, 1998; Seth Faison: "Beyond the Dalai Lama, His Successor Could Be the Solution," The New York Times, November 15, 1998. The explanation floated, also in the Western press, was that unless he died and was reborn in Tibet, the Chinese would not accept a future Dalai Lama. Although full of contradictions that leave everyone guessing, this explanation nevertheless points to the need of ensuring the continuity of the institution of Dalai Lama, He said recently, too, "I also believe that the Tibetan people should be able to decide their future, their form of government and their social system,' he wrote, adding that no Tibetan is interested in restoring outdated political and social
institutions. The Asian Wall Street Journal, Hongkong, December 9, 1998, from Dow Jones, a newswire service (+) something that has come to represent the nation in lieu of a country. The clearer it becomes that Tibet is lost, the stronger is the clinging to the institution of Dalai Lama. Hence, Tibetans resist vehemently anything that can be construed as a criticism of his person or administration and react with irrational fury to anything that can be seen as a threat even to his reputation or legacy, let alone his life. For example, the Tibetan Youth Congress, although patriotic in defending the reputation of the Dalai Lama, also advocates political violence and "to struggle for the total independence of Tibet even at the cost of one's life," as stated in TYC's aims and objectives. It is thus in opposition to the Dalai Lama on independence versus autonomy under Chinese rule. Even many monks do not listen to the Dalai Lama's positive advice. In the last two years, the Tibetan population in New York more than quadrupled. Many of them are monks who have left their monasteries without permission from their abbots and religious community to seek material fortune in the West ostensibly for virtuous reasons. The Dalai Lama, in addressing a group of Tibetans in Washington D.C. in November 1998, told them that they should return to their monasteries and that they were merely riding on his robes. Yet, they keep coming.

It is not difficult to see that Tibetans are going through the most severe identity crisis in their history. Those living in exile have been displaced from their homeland and those left in Tibet from their culture. The complex set of problems created by all these forced changes in an already complicated society with arcane social practices remain largely inaccessible to the Western mind. Most do not affect us. Yet Tibetans have been a genuine source for spiritual discovery in the last decades for many people around the world, and the Dalai Lama a powerful source of inspiration. There are a number of religious issues embedded in Tibetan political and social problems that take some effort to extricate. The one I found especially striking in its impenetrable abstruseness is the Dorje Shugden Rdo.rje is Tibetan for the Sanskrit word vajra. Anything so designated refers to the state of complete enlightenment, used in the vajrayana vehicle of Buddhism as symbol of the indivisibility of [illusory] body and mind [of clear light] and their ultimate union. Shugden means being endowed with power, force, strength. The name thus means "the one with vajra force," or the force of the Buddha's enlightenment in specific actions. For different historical interpretations of Dorje Shugden at the intersection of Tibetan mix of religion and politics, see Part II, 17th Century. protector conflict rooted in the Dalai Lama's restrictions of his practice, which surfaced in 1996 to receive international attention. It exposes the fault lines and depth of the Tibetan identity crisis like few others. To measure how deep the crisis goes, consider the following statement by Ngawang Tenpa, Officer of the Cholsum organization, the largest regional group in Tibetan politics, "It is possible to think of a time when we will make friends with the Chinese, but with these (Dorje Shugden) people -- never," During a conference in Dharamsala, at T.I.P.A., called by United Cholsum Organization, August 27-31. On video (in Tibetan) of that conference produced by "Sargyur," a private Tibetan company in India. Inquiring into the circumstances for its eruption, I found out more about Tibetans than I had in many years of participating in human rights work and following the teachings of their masters. The Dorje Shugden conflict serves as an example of the ever widening gap between appearance and reality in the increasingly fractious refugee community.

In March 1996, See detailed documentation of these events in Part II below. His Holiness strongly advised his followers not to rely on the Dharmapala Dorje Shugden because, according to the prophecies of his oracles, Dorje Shugden harms the institution of Dalai Lama, his life, his government, and the cause of Tibet. See, for example, the prophecies (kha.lung) of the State Oracle Nechung, the Tsangba Oracle, and Tenma, or Tsering Chenga oracles given in 1995 in Infallible Prophecies of the Tibetan Government Oracles, published by the Department of Religion and Culture of the exile government, Dharamsala, 1996, in Tibetan; translated excerpts given below, Part II. Immediately government offices promulgated this advice, stated in no uncertain terms by the Dalai Lama, and turned it into a full-fledged ban. The words mostly used are bkag.sdom.byed.pa and its synonym dam.bskrags.byed.pa meaning "ban," "prohibition," "restriction," "restraint;" New Light English-Tibetan Dictionary compiled by T.G. Dongthog, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA), Dharamsala, 1985, Second Edition, p. 31, p. 352, p. 383, p. 382; also, in Tibetan, one term is used to define the other: bkag.sdom byed.pa: gang jung byed michog pa'i dam.bsrags byed.pa, Bod Gya Tsig Zoed Chenmo (The Chinese - Tibetan Dictionary), People's Publishing House, Beijing, Second Edition, 1996. The word bkod.'doms, "order to stop," thus "ban" is used in Resolution No. 21 of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies prohibiting Dorje Shugden in very strong terms as to "never ever" permit the practice, that is, from now until forever. In addition, Resolution No. 21 refers to the 13th and 14th Dalai Lama's use of the word bkag.'gog, "order" and "prohibition" "to stop" or "to take out forcibly." The Private Office of the Dalai Lama in a letter to the abbot of Sermay Monastery in Bylakuppe, March 30th, 1996 mentions a ban (bkag.sdom and dam.bsgrags bkag.sdom) by the 13th Dalai Lama to justify the prohibition of Dorje Shugden on the basis of the so-called "prophecies" by government oracles pointing towards danger to the health of the Dalai Lama and the cause of Tibet. On May 8th, 1996 in a public address in Dharamsala (on video tape), for example, the Dalai Lama says, "It has been twenty years since I first mentioned the Dorje Shugden public restriction (ngas dam.bsdrags byed..pa.yin). Also, in an address on May 5, 1996, the Dalai Lama say, "It may have been about ten years ago. While giving a lam.rim teaching at Drepung, I once gave my reasons for issuing the ban." (Tibetan: dam.bskrags); Select Addresses of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the Issue of Propitiating Protector Deities, Sherig Parkhang, Dharamsala, July 10, 1996, p. 175; and "In this way came the reasons, on account of which I have issued the ban (Tibetan: dam.bsgrags) in recent times. In banning [this reliance on Shugden], many came forward and declared that henceforth they will abide by my injunctions...." p. 183. Also, the term dgag.bya spyi nan shugs cher bstsal.rjes or "strong prohibition emphatically proclaimed" is used in Report No. 28/7.8/1997 by the exile Tibetan version of [India's most secret police] RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) of the Department of Security in Dharamsala, "Specifically, after issuing an emphatic ban at his [the Dalai Lama] spring teachings of 1996, most of the Tibetans living in exile and within Tibet, who are gifted with intelligence and patriotism, have respectfully complied and appreciatively mended their faith accordingly." When a Swiss journalist asks the Dalai Lama on camera, "Why this ban?" he answers, "Tibetan Buddhism is such a profound tradition. ...etc." The Dalai Lama does not deny a ban when asked "Why the ban?" Swiss TV DRS Series "10 vor 10," "Bruderzwist," broadcast Jan. 5-9, 1998. Also, the Dalai himself refers to his "restriction" of Dorje Shugden as a "harsh step," quoted in an Announcement by Kashag (Cabinet), May 22, 1996. Everyone then, including the Dalai Lama, referred to the conflict as "a ban." Later, after questions from the international press, the exile government denied that there was a ban and continues to hold this position. June issue of the Tibetan language magazine Boed-Mi-Tsa-Dhoen, for example, on p. 2, the Dalai Lama is quoted as saying in America on May 5th, "I did not encourage anyone to practice Dorje Shugden nor did I ban its worship." At the time, the strong reaction by the exile government For example, with statements like, "If Tibetans in general and worshipers of Dholgyal [Dorje Shugden] in particular do not immediately stop worshiping [him], an intolerable time will be upon us. For this reason, we cannot take refuge in the concept of freedom of religion." Announcement by the Kashag (Cabinet of the Tibetan exile government), May 22, 1996. to the oracles' As an example of just how important the State Oracle is to the Tibetan exile government, see their website and the detailed account of Nechung, its history, monastery, and even all the successive mediums that served as Nechung's oracle since 1544, during the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama's reign, when he first came through a human being in trance, according to the government. prophecies and the Dalai Lama's statements For example, "It will be the last resort if [we] have to knock on [their/your] doors. It would be good if [they/you] can heed this without [us] having to resort to this last step." The Dalai Lama in a public address March 10, 1996, and on March 21, 1996, "If you wish the speedy death of the Dalai Lama, then I have no objection [to your continuing to rely on Dholgyal (Dorje Shugden)]. resulted in forced signature campaigns, where Tibetans were pressured under threat of force or expulsion to sign a document forswearing Dorje Shugden, desecration and destruction of holy images, death threats and threats of violence. Although few violent incidents actually occurred, the campaign of fear and intimidation pressuring Tibetans to give up their age old religious practice to "save" the Dalai Lama and the "cause of Tibet" resulted in dividing the community, ostracism, loss of revenues for monasteries and businesses, loss of opportunities for education, travel, economic advancement, social welfare, and threatens the survival of a religious tradition. Chinese authorities, ever on the lookout to embarrass the Dalai Lama and to disparage his followers, did not waste time in 1996 to seize the issue to serve their divisive ends. They criticized the Dalai Lama for betraying his bodhisattva aims, meant to benefit others without concern for one's own health and well-being as is befitting a religious person. Wei Se: "Dalai Disavows Guardian of Buddhist Doctrine," China's Tibet, No. 6, 1996 This was an especially embarrassing charge for someone so widely believed to be a manifestation of Avalokiteshvara, Buddha of compassion. The government in exile used the Chinese interference effectively to silence most critics of the ban, In the early days of the conflict, many, especially educated, Tibetans who were neutral concerning this particular protector were vocal in private circles criticizing the exile government's excesses on political grounds, recognizing that the ban was undemocratic and threatened the future political development of Tibetans and their chance to form democratic habits and institutions. conveniently reversing cause and effect by claiming that Buddhists who rely on Dorje Shugden had caused the conflict and that they were working for the Chinese. This is considered the ultimate betrayal in the Tibetan exile community, the equivalent to high treason.

Dharmapala Dorje Shugden is held in high esteem by many Tibetans as a powerful guardian of religious vows and law. A Dharmapala plays the role of a caretaker or guardian of Buddhist practice. Like parents, he or she is believed to help with establishing conditions conducive for spiritual practice and to avert harm and interferences. The Buddha is the ultimate authority but, just like a president, he or she has aides who work out and enforce the details on the day to day level spanning many degrees in rank. Dharmapalas are also beings on the path to enlightenment. Some of them go back to the time of the Buddha, others evolved in Tibet. Some of the most widely revered Buddhist masters in the last three hundred fifty years of Tibetan history relied on Dorje Shugden as their guardian, including the Dalai Lama until the mid-1970's. They considered him an emanation whose nature is the wisdom of the Buddha Manjushri but appearing mostly in a worldly, fierce way. This century, Kyabje Tib.: skyabs.rje,meaning saving grace or protective lord, an epithet traditionally attributed only to the few Lamas with comprehensive knowledge of different Buddhist traditions, or lineage holders. Trijang Rinpoche, one of the two mentors of the Dalai Lama, Kyabje Pabongka Rinpoche and Tomo Geshe Rinpoche were the most renowned and influential masters of the Gelug tradition, the largest order of Tibetan Buddhism. With their fame also spread that of their guardian, Dorje Shugden. He is believed to be extremely powerful, swift, and precise. Although different views about him were known in Tibet, in exile, this Dharmapala became demonized in unprecedented ways even for Tibetans. The aim was to destroy the practice of Dorje Shugden -- not its possible misuse -- since at no time was any distinction made between relying responsibly on this guardian deity and misuse to which all religious practices are subject.

The source of the demonization was oracles (mediums in trance) of the Tibetan exile government many Tibetans believe to be unreliable. Their prophecies declared Dorje Shugden to be an evil spirit intent on harming the Dalai Lama and the cause of Tibet Infallible Prophecies of the Tibetan Government Oracles, published by the Department of Religion and Culture of the exile government, Dharamsala, 1996. seen by many as synonymous. The exile government's continuing uncompromising stand on this point polarized the issue and turned any attempt to present a different interpretation, even those made in good faith, into an attack on the Dalai Lama and, hence, a confirmation of the "prophecies." Thus, the Dorje Shugden believed to be evil and the one religious people rely on seem to have nothing whatsoever to do with each other. They are two different beings with each side believing that the other invented its own story of Dorje Shugden. They could not be further apart, one a demon, carrier of seemingly absolute evil, the other believed by most of Tibet's greatest Buddhist masters to be an emanation of the Buddha's wisdom within worldly action. In part, these different views are the result of dragging into the political arena an esoteric religious practice that is easily misunderstood, especially when made public in this way. The difference between the two radically different conceptions of Dorje Shugden also pits two kinds of authority against each other, one religious the other political. Proclaiming Dorje Shugden an evil spirit denies more than two hundred acclaimed Tibetan Buddhist masters -- not counting their tens of thousands of disciples -- their religious qualifications. These are based on the ability to distinguish between good and evil, the very essence of wisdom. From a Buddhist point of view this is clearly absurd. It makes sense only from a non-religious context. Hence, the differences concerning Dorje Shugden have to be considered from a political point of view.

In the summer of 1996, the Tibetan government in exile was accused of human rights violations by many Tibetans and some of their Western supporters. Since then most critics have been pressured into silence. Although two prominent human rights organizations expressed their concerns privately to the exile government, they refused to do so publicly for several reasons including that it could be seen as undermining the efforts of the Dalai Lama and the much larger and more serious issue of improving human rights in Tibet under Chinese control. I have seen one of the letters shown to me on condition I not disclose it and its source. Amnesty International specified recently that there had been no human rights violations -- torture, death penalty, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detention and unfair trials -- in the Tibetan exile community as a result of the Dorje Shugden conflict. "None of the material Amnesty International has received contain evidence of abuses which fall within the violations of fundamental human rights including torture, the death penalty, extra-judicial execution, arbitrary detention or imprisonment or unfair trials." Ngawang Rabgyal, Office of Tibet [New York], in a letter to the editor of The Nation, Oct. 5, 1998 (Volume 267, Number 10), p. 2; Tribune News Service, India, July 25, 1998. Perhaps there is a conflict of interest for Amnesty International to investigate human rights cases in the Tibetan exile community. AI, after many years of silence now represent the Dalai Lama's extremely important human rights campaign in Tibet where abuses are rampant. AI also uses the fame of the Dalai Lama for fund raising purposes. For example, an appeal from October 1998 that includes a letter by the Dalai Lama. Since the Tibetan exile government has to function under Indian law, it is clear that it could not use such methods to begin with. The methods Dharamsala has used to pressure Tibetans into giving up one of their cherished religious practices and the tradition it is meant to protect are based on silencing any genuine disagreement with its policies through a kind of psychological warfare that uses threats against those perceived to disagree with the Dalai Lama, intimidation, and social pressure. How this gets played out in a uniquely Tibetan way in their unusual exile circumstances will, I hope, become clearer in the course of the book.

Part I - Tibetan Voices

howardbloom.net home

The following account of the 1, 350-year-long
Moslem crusade against the West is taken from
The Lucifer Principle
A Scientific Expedition Into The Forces Of History

ISLAM'S WAR
AGAINST
THE WEST

by

Howard Bloom

Before 9/11, the webpage of Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque allowed those who speak English to hear and read the words used in its weekly Friday sermons to promote violence against non-believers. After 9/11, the English-language translation of the site was removed. Click here to see what's left. Then click Islam's War Against The West on the navigation bar to the left to continue.

"Man's greatest good fortune is to chase and defeat his enemy, seize his total possessions, leave his married women weeping and wailing, ride his gelding (and) use the bodies of his women as a nightshirt and support." Genghis Khan

"He butchered three of them with an ax and decapitated them. In other words, instead of using a gun to kill them he took a hatchet to chop their heads off. He struggled face to face with one of them, and throwing down his ax managed to break his neck and devour his flesh in front of his comrades. ...I ...award him the Medal of the Republic." General Mustafa Tlas, Syria's Minister of Defense praising a hero of the 1973 war with Israel before the Syrian National Assembly

"Appeasing of governments which revel in slaughter is an invitation to worldwide catastrophe." Fang Lizhi

for news on the Islamic world
from the Islamic point of view
click the site above

Two thousand three hundred years ago a Greek who even his fellow Greeks called a barbarian conquered the entire Persian Empire. His name was Alexander the Great.

The whole thing was as unlikely as the Vietnamese turning around and conquering the U.S. But it happened. In fact, in history it happens over and over again.

It happened in 1870 when the French were forced to fight a country which just a few years earlier had been a disorganized clutter of rag-tag mini-states ruled by comic opera princes. The land of Napoleon was rated by every armchair general as the mightiest military force on the Continent. But France lost. Its army was chopped up like ground round. Its glorious capital, Paris, faced the humiliation of a foreign army marching down its streets. The upstart nation that had brought France to its knees was... Germany.

An equally surprising fate occurred to England when it trained its guns on the superpowers of its day in two world wars. When the smoke had cleared, two backward nations of Johnny-come-latelies ended up dominating the world. These countries, whose inhabitants had usually been regarded as just one small step above the primitive, were The United States and Russia.

The moral is simple. Never forget the pecking order's surprises. Today's superpower is tomorrow's conquered state. Yesterday's overlooked mob is often the ruler of tomorrow. Never underestimate the third world. Never be complacent about barbarians.

World Trade Center September 11, 2001
photo: Howard Bloom

Some readers will be outraged by my presumption. How dare I regard any group as barbaric. What appalling ethnocentrism! There are no barbarians. There are simply cultures we haven't taken the time to understand. Cultures to whom we haven't given sufficient aid. Cultures in need of development. Beneath the skin, all men and women are the same. They have the same needs, the same emotions, and the same ideals. If you simply took those folks you speak of so contemptuously out for a cup of coffee, you would discover that they are just like you and me.

But there are barbarians--people whose cultures glorify the act of murder, and elevate violence to a holy deed. These cultures portray the extinction of other human beings as a validation of manliness, a heroic gesture in the name of truth, or simply a good way to get ahead in the world.

Certain Islamic societies tend to be high on this list. On November 28, 1943, Franklin Roosevelt met secretly with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill in Iran. When Roosevelt returned home, he sent a telegram to the Shah thanking the Iranian ruler for his hospitality. The President explained that he'd noticed the hills in Iran were bare. American agronomists had learned to prevent soil erosion and enrich the landscape by planting trees on slopes like these. Roosevelt suggested an experimental tree-planting program.

The Iranian leader thanked FDR. But privately the young potentate was highly insulted: According to Moslem standards, the gift demeaned his virility. Stalin was far more understanding of Mohammedan culture. He offered the Shah tanks and planes.

Hafez al-Assad, father of the current leader of Syria, worked hard to solidify his position as the country's undisputed ruler. He didn't do it by selling Syria's citizens on the values of his political platform. Instead, he slaughtered 20,000 Moslem Fundamentalists who opposed him.

According to The New York Times, in 1980 Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, had a Lebanese imam (a holy man roughly equivalent to a pastor) shot in the head for refusing to preach the propaganda of the PLO. Then Arafat visited the imam's Lebanese home, took his ten-year-old son aside, explained to the little boy that his father had been murdered by the Israelis, handed the lad a gun, and said, "When you grow up, use this to take revenge." Arafat wanted the boy to be a killer.

Holiness, righteousness, and even day-to-day propriety in Islamic cultures are based on the example of Mohammed. Though Islamic literature praises Mohammed as a man of peace, he was also a military leader. In 624 AD, The Prophet announced the concept of the Jihad--the holy war. He said in the blessed book, The Koran, "I will instill terror into the hearts of the unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all their finger-tips off them. ...And slay them wherever ye catch them...." In the next nine years, the man of peace ordered a minimum of 27 military campaigns. He personally led nine of them.

It is not surprising that Moslem jurists would later declare that there are two worlds: the world of Islam--Dar al-Islam--and the non-Islamic world--Dar al-Harb. These two territorial spheres, explained the Moslem scholars, are in a state of perpetual war. According to some Koranic interpreters, any leader who fails to "make wide slaughter" in the land of the infidel is committing a sin. A statesman is only allowed the temporary expedient of peace if his forces are not yet strong enough to win.

This may explain why Elias Canetti, in his Nobel Prize-winning book Crowds and Power, calls Islam a killer religion, literally "a Religion of War."

for more news on the Arab world told from the Arab
point of view, click here

In reality, Islam, like most other religions, has both its positive and its negative sides. It imposes a host of admirable responsibilities on its adherents: for example, zakat, the presentation of regular, substantial contributions to the poor. Allah also demands that his followers "give glad tidings to those who believe and work righteousness," "cover not Truth with falsehood nor conceal the Truth when ye know (what it is)," and "treat with kindness your parents and kindred and orphans and those in need."

However, Allah issues many a darker order as well. And the percentage of modern Islamic adherents who have focused on Allah's calls to combat is dismaying. Today, the descendants of the Persians who fought the Greeks in 480 BC are devout Moslems. In the '30s, one of them labored diligently to become an Islamic scholar. He pored over the Koran for years. As he demonstrated his superior knowledge of Allah's pronouncements, he rose in the ranks of Iranian holy men. Finally he achieved the penultimate title--ayatollah (roughly equivalent to a Catholic cardinal).

His name was Ruhollah Khomeini, and he wrote books, pamphlets, and even taped and distributed his speeches to inspire the citizens of Iran with sacred virtue. The ayatollah's words roused Iranians to overthrow the shah and usher in a government based on strict Islamic doctrine. What did the ayatollah's pronouncements say- Among other things, that infidels are like dogs. Their existence is an affront to Allah.

Here's how the ayatollah himself put it: "...Moslems have no alternative... to an armed holy war against profane governments. ...Holy war means the conquest of all non-Moslem territories. ...It will ...be the duty of every able-bodied adult male to volunteer for this war of conquest, the final aim of which is to put Koranic law in power from one end of the earth to the other. "The leaders of the USSR and of England and the president of the United States are ...infidels.... ...Every part of the body of a non-Moslem individual is impure, even the hair on his head and his body hair, his nails, and all the secretions of his body. Any man or woman who denies the existence of God, or believes in His partners [the Christian Trinity], or else does not believe in His Prophet Mohammed, is impure (in the same way as are excrement, urine, dog, and wine)[sic]."

Concluded the Ayatollah, "Islam does not allow peace between... a Moslem and an infidel." Though many of us imagine that the promotion of harmony is a prime objective of every major world faith, the ayatollah disagreed. "The leaders of our religion were all soldiers, commanders and warriors," he wrote, "...they killed and they were killed."

The concept of a peaceful prophet was so alien to the ayatollah that he was convinced Christ's message had been deliberately distorted by Westerners. Said Khomeini, "This idea of turning the other cheek has been wrongly attributed to Jesus (peace be unto him); it is those barbaric imperialists that have attributed it to him. Jesus was a prophet, and no prophet can be so illogical."

Khomeini's dicta may seem irrelevant now that he has long been dead, but his words have actually gained in influence since his demise. Early in the '90s, Iraq's humiliation in the Gulf War undermined the credibility of the secular Moslem regimes, leaving a power vacuum into which Fundamentalism leaped. There are currently roughly 100,000,000 Islamic fundamentalists (rechristened "Islamic revivalists" by some scholars ).

Activists among them, employing the slogan "Africa for Islam," are making diligent--and often violent--efforts to seize power in numerous sub-Saharan states. They have gained sufficient favor with South Africa's ANC that Nelson Mandela, in a 1992 visit to Teheran, told the Iranians that Africa must be reshaped along the lines of the Iranian revolution. (Ironically, when South African leader Bishop Desmond Tutu gave a speech to a Palestinian crowd in 1989 lauding Palestinian interests, he failed to realize that the Arabic banners carried by his listeners read "On Saturday We Will Kill the Jews, on Sunday We Will Kill the Christians!")

Khomeini-style fundamentalists have become vigorous political forces in areas like China's Sinkiang region (where as of 1994, Beijing officials were seriously concerned that the area's inhabitants, influenced by propaganda from Iran, would attempt to break away and found a fundamentalist Islamic republic).

Islamic fundamentalists have been involved in the Indian state of Kashmir's vicious civil war. They've been active in Malaysia, Thailand (where Moslem guerilla forces were fighting in 1993), and the Sudan (where an Iranian-backed fundamentalist regime is engaged in a campaign to subjugate, exterminate or--according to the United Nations International Labor Organization--literally enslave the black Christians and animists in the southern region of the country).

Followers of Khomeini have been moving aggressively in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan (where by 1992 posters and portraits of the ayatollah had become a particularly strong sales item in local stores), France, and, according to Greek Defense Minister Ioannis Varitsiotes and the University of Belgrade's Dragoljub R. Zivojinovic, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Yugoslavia.

In many of these cases, fundamentalists are sweeping elections, manipulating generals, funding insurrections, sponsoring terrorism, or actually taking control. Islamic fundamentalists have poured money into America's black communities in an effort that has brought more than a million U.S. African Americans over to the one true faith.

While most of these converts remain peaceful, Al-Fuqra, a predominantly African-American Islamic group under the leadership of Pakistani Sheikh Mubarak Ali Jilani Hashemi, has declared a jihad in North America, and, according to law enforcement agencies, has been involved in bombings, murders and other forms of bloodshed in Colorado, Arizona, Pennsylvania and Canada.

It has been reported that Al-Fuqra also had a hand in the 1993 effort to blow up New York's United Nations building, the city's FBI headquarters, and its Holland and Lincoln Tunnels. When the Iranians declared a death-sentence on British author Salman Rushdie, black American imams everywhere from Brooklyn to Los Angeles enthusiastically supported the move. (So did the Moslem head of UCLA's Middle Eastern Studies Department.)

Even a loyal African-American Gulf War veteran, won over to Allah in 1991, stated after his change in faith that "soon it [Islam] will take over all of America, then the world."

The U.S. African-American community is only a beachhead. Islamic forces have been attempting to gain control of U.S. media outlets in the hope of using them as propaganda tools for the Moslem point of view. The Saudis and America's Christian fundamentalists battled in the early '90s for the right to purchase America's second largest wire service, UPI. Ultimately, the Arabs won.

In addition, Amal Adam, the former head of Saudi Arabia's equivalent of the CIA, was the primary backer of a British-based firm called Capcom, whose chief officers were the heads of TCI (Telecommunications Incorporated), America's largest player in the cable television game. In 1993, TCI made headlines when it came within a hair's breadth of merging with Bell/Atlantic. Had the effort succeeded, it would have formed what financial analysts universally heralded as one of the giants of the coming interactive media revolution, giving the Saudis additional leverage for American media manipulation.

The ground is ripe for worldwide Islamic fundamentalist expansion. Mohammedanism is currently the fastest-growing religion on the planet. There are a billion Moslems--as many as Jews and Christians combined--and that number is increasing daily. According to Cairo University's Professor Ali Dessouki , 50 countries are now Islamic.

What's more, there are massive Mohammedan populations everywhere from Nigeria to Mongolia, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines. The countries with the world's largest Islamic bodies of citizenry are not even parts of the Arab world--they are Indonesia and China.

To top it off, Islamic public opinion, if the Arabs, Iranians and Pakistanis are an accurate barometer, is virulently anti-American.

Today's Islam extremism is the perfect example of a meme grown ravenous. Saddam Hussein, in his 1990 drive for expansion, claimed to be following Allah's message. The late General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, former head of Pakistan, who masterminded the fundamentalist-led Afghan resistance efforts using U.S. funds, kept a map in his office with all Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia marked in green. It was the symbol of his ultimate ambition--unified Moslem rule extending through every green-marked territory.

In 1990, one enthusiastic Turkish official, minister of state Ercument Konukman, noted the substantial Turkish populations in the former Soviet Union and China, and looked forward to uniting them "under the colors of the Turkish flag."

A fundamentalist clergyman in Lebanon says, "Don't believe that we want an Islamic republic in Lebanon. ...What Hezbollah wants is a world Islamic republic."

Cairo constitutional lawyer Dr. A.K. Aboulmagd adds, "I even venture sometimes to say that Islam was not meant to serve the early days of Islam, when life was primitive and when social institutions were still stable and working. It was...meant to be put in a freezer and to be taken out when it will be really needed. And I believe that the time has come. ...The mission of Islam lies not in the past, but in the future."

Dr. Abd El Sabour Shahin of Cairo goes a step further and warns that Western civilization makes a big mistake when it "thinks it will endlessly remain dominant."

tour this site to see how modern Islam is using
cyberspace to convert the West

Even secular Moslem intellectuals teaching in the top universities of the United States and Europe have joined the expansionist bandwagon, calling for a leader who will pull world Islam together into an unstoppable force. "Islam will... take over the world," said an Egyptian in Cairo in the late '80s to a crew from Britain's Granada tv.

No isolated, gray-haired zealot, he was one of a new breed of young university graduates, members of the middle class, and professionals, often among the highest achievers in their region. These religious devotees do not have a happy fate in store for those of us in the west. Explained the young Egyptian, "Islam is a tree that feeds on blood and grows on severed limbs."

In the early and mid-nineties, a spate of books and articles appeared proclaiming that, despite such rhetoric, Islam poses no geopolitical danger. Abul Aziz Said, of the School of International Service at American University, said point blank that "Islamic fundamentalism is not the enemy of the west." "Islamic fundamentalism," he declared, "is a defensive social and political movement, a reaction to westernization and modernization." It is, he insisted, "an attempt to restore an old civilization, not create a new empire."

Yet, later in his article, Said said that ancient imperial triumphs were at the heart of the "world influence" fundamentalists were legitimately attempting to "regain." And the veil slipped a bit from his true feelings when, zeroing in on his conclusion, he declared that "imitative responses of Muslims to the challenge of the West...evince...identification with the 'enemy.'"

John L. Esposito, former president of the Middle East Studies Association, criticized "the creation of an imagined monolithic Islam" and contended that those apprehensive about fundamentalism "fail to account for the diversity of Muslim practice." Palestinian-born Columbia University scholar Edward Said echoed the assertion that diversity renders the notion of an Islamic threat, in Said's word, "phony."

However, diversity within a cultural community does not necessarily halt its expansionist drive. The European West spread its often brutal control over every continent while so divided and "diverse" that it was engaged in an almost nonstop series of internecine wars. And early Islam conquered a territory almost equally vast while its leaders squabbled and fought, and its religious sects were rent by schism.

Esposito, like many other writers on the topic, justifies the ferocity of anti-western Islamic sentiments by reminding us that "many in the Arab and Muslim world view the history of Islam and of the Muslim world's dealings with the West as one of victimization and oppression at the hands of an expansive imperial power."

There's no question he is right. However the Islamic world held the upper hand in the struggle between the Occident and the Levant for over 1,100 years. The West managed to turn the tables briefly when the Crusaders established a short-lived middle eastern toehold.

The Crusader states were not planted on undisputed Moslem land. The heartland of the Islamic empire, the section bordering the Mediterranean rim, was a deeply Christian area, a vital spiritual and economic core of a "Western" imperium which, for over six hundred years before Mohammed's birth, had included the non-Arab provinces of Turkey (known then as Asia, Galatia, Bithynia, Pontus and Cappadocia--where St. Paul established many of the first churches), Syria (whose city of Damascus was one of the earliest major Christian centers), Israel (homeland to the Jews since roughly 1,200 B.C., and, despite Roman efforts to expel the native population, still dotted with Hebrew villages when the Moslems arrived sword in hand), Egypt (populated at the time by rabidly Christian descendants of the pyramid-builders, along with significant numbers of Greeks and Jews), Libya (the former Cyrenaica), Tunisia (Carthage and its environs, where St. Augustine was born and eventually became bishop of Hippo), and Northern Algeria and Morocco (then called Mauritania).

These were the countries that had produced the Bible, the Christian monastic movement (born in Egypt), St. Jerome's conversion (in what is now Turkey), St. John of Damascus, the famed early church historian Bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, Origen, Saint Athanasius, the Aryan heresy, a significant number of fathers of the Roman Catholic faith and the Eastern Orthodox creed. The knights of the cross did not retain their reconquered kingdoms long. They took Jerusalem in 1099 and were expelled by 1187.

Nonetheless, according to historian Amin Maalouf, the author of The Crusades Through Arab Eyes, modern Arabs tend to see today's world events as a continuation of the Crusades.

For 600 years after the fall of the Crusader states, Islamic forces returned to the attack, capturing Greece and chunks of Eastern Europe, raiding towns in Sicily and the Italian coasts for goods and slaves, preying on Mediterranean shipping, chaining Europeans like Miguel Cervantes to the oars of their galleys, and until 1826 forcing the Christian citizens of Yugoslavia and Albania to give up their children to Moslem overlords (who brought up the males on the Koran, then turned them into soldiers known as Janissaries).

It wasn't until 1798 that Napoleon began to shift the balance between East and West again when he briefly invaded Egypt, from which he was ignominiously expelled by the British and the Turks. But the heavy-handed fertile crescent "imperialism" so resented by the Arabs didn't begin until after the First World War, and it lasted less than 40 years.

Southern Spain remained under the Moslem yoke for 781 years, Greece for 381, and pieces of longtime Christian terrain like St. Augustine's North African homeland and the religious and secular capital that eventually eclipsed Rome in power and splendor--Byzantium--are still in Moslem hands today.

Syria, on the other hand, was only under western control for 21 years, Egypt for 67, and Iraq a mere 15.

If one accepts Esposito's reasoning, Westerners--who were bludgeoned by "an expansive imperial" Islam for well over a millennium--have more right to fear an Islamic revival than Moslems have to hate the West. More to the point, Phebe Marr, of the National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies, contends that militant extremist groups dedicated to violence and an absolute rejection of the West are small. In addition, she claims, "The radicals do not have a broad base of popular support. ...Even in Lebanon, however, where such groups flourish, a poll of university students taken in 1987 indicated that more than 90% disapproved of...assassinations, hostage taking, and sabotage of government installations."

On the other hand, Marr admits that "there may be only a thin line between the open, mainstream movements and their clandestine [violent] counterparts." She concludes that "the Islamic revival is not only here to stay but is likely to be a leading domestic political force shaping the Mediterranean region during the coming decades. Despite political vicissitudes, the various movements loosely collected under the rubric of 'Islamic Fundamentalism' have shown a staying power that indicates they have achieved both breadth and depth in their indigenous societies."

Like Marr, Abbas Hamdani, professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Wisconsin, asserts that "to propose a monolithic view of Islam and then equate it with fundamentalism would be wrong.... Except for mass followings in Algeria and Tunisia, fundamentalists represent a small segment, although a popular, vocal, and highly motivated one, of the total population. [Hamdani overlooks the Sudan and Afghanistan, both of which, at this writing, were in fundamentalist hands.] Even in Iran, which appears to be totally convulsed in fundamentalism, it is a small minority that has monopolized power." As the case of Iran demonstrates, it only takes a minority to seize control of a country, especially if that minority is enthusiastic about using violence.

In Germany's July, 1932, elections, 63% of the voters cast their ballots against the Nazis. By the November elections, the anti-Nazi vote was even larger. Yet Adolf Hitler was able to achieve dictatorial power only four months later on March 23, 1933, in part because his storm troopers--like the militant gangs controlled by the fundamentalists--were willing to murder their opponents.

Khomeini's works advocate vigorously converting or murdering all those who do not embrace Allah's holy meme. Then they urge a holy war on the nations of the West.

The ayatollah wrote, "Any nonreligious [i.e. non-Islamic] power, whatever form or shape, is necessarily an atheistic power, the tool of Satan; it is part of our duty to stand in its path and to struggle against its effects. Such Satanic power can engender nothing but corruption on earth, the supreme evil which must be pitilessly fought and rooted out. To achieve that end, we have no recourse other than to overthrow all governments that do not rest on pure Islamic principles, and are thus corrupt and corrupting, and to tear down the traitorous, rotten, unjust, and tyrannical administrative systems that serve them.... If Islamic civilization had governed the West, we would no longer have to put up with these barbaric goings-on unworthy even of wild animals....[Western governments are] using inhuman laws and inhuman political methods... Misdeeds must be punished by the law of retaliation: cut off the hands of the thief; kill the murderer instead of putting him in prison; flog the adulterous woman or man. Your concerns, your 'humanitarian' scruples, are more childish than reasonable."

Khomeini had a prescription for such problems: "All of humanity must strike these troublemakers [the governments of the West] with an iron hand.... Islam has obliterated many tribes because they were sources of corruption [i.e. sources of non-Islamic influence]...." Judging from the Ayatollah's rhetoric, the next tribes he would have liked to see obliterated were those in Europe and America.

Allah is rapidly providing Khomeini's followers with a sword to carry out their master's wishes. He has offered Islam the fire in which the Koran says those who follow false faiths are destined to burn: nuclear weaponry. He has also provided the long range missiles needed to use it. According to the late imam's logic, there may be only one just and righteous thing to do: employ this technology to wipe out recalcitrant heathens like you and me.

The modern growth of Islam is the coalescence of a superorganism drawn together by the magnetic attraction of a meme. But this meme has an advantage: The social body it is trying to pull together has existed as a unified social beast in the past. The old reflexes of solidarity are still there, waiting to be aroused.

The meme of the new Islam is not laboring to generate a small and fragile embryo. It is simply attempting to awaken a sleeping giant.

9

for footnotes, see below

a chapter from
The Lucifer Principle
A Scientific Expedition Into The Forces Of History

to order The Lucifer Principle from Amazon.com
click here

for more on the dangers of
21st Century extremisms
order
Global Brain
The Evolution of Mass Mind From the Big Bang
to the 21st Century

Notes

. William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp: 1587-1968, pp. 125-137, 143-148. Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany, p. 422.
. For a very different analysis of the barbarian menace through history, one which nonetheless supports the conclusions of this chapter, see Bennett Bronson, "The Role of Barbarians in the Fall of States," Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, ed., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, pp. 196-218.
. Mohammed Heikal, The Return of the Ayatollah, pp. 39-40. The Shah eagerly accepted Stalin's deal... until he found out that it entailed hosting a small army of Soviet advisors and technicians.
. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I, p. 640 gives the figure of 10,000. British author David Pryce-Jones says the death toll was actually "several tens of thousands." (David Pryce-Jones, "Self-Determination, Arab Style," Commentary, January, 1989, p. 43.) Twenty thousand is the most commonly used estimate.
. "The Tale of the Recalcitrant Imam," The New York Times, July 25, 1982, p. 12. In early 1989, shortly after he gained a new reputation as a man of peace, Arafat made it clear that he still felt disputes between Mohammedans should be settled with bullets. In an interview with Radio Monte Carlo about the Arab uprising in Israel, Arafat said, "Whoever thinks of stopping the intifada before it achieves its goals, I will give him ten bullets in the chest." ("Arafat unmasked--by his own words," New York Post, January 23, 1989, p. 22.)
. Said Mohammed, "I have bequeathed to you that which will always be a guide to you, if you will take hold of it; the Book of God and the practices of my life." This saying and its implications have been critical in the development of Islam. (Mohammed Heikal, The Return of the Ayatollah, p. 80.)
. "I will instill terror into the hearts of the unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all their finger-tips off them. The Qu'ran, downloaded from America Online's "Islam Library," original upload 1996, "Al-Anfal"--sura 12.
"...And slay them wherever ye catch them...." The Qu'ran, "Al-Baqara"--sura 191.

for a searchable version of the Qu'ran
click here

In a petition sent to Atlantic Monthly Press objecting to this chapter, the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee points out that many Moslems feel that these are the words of God, not of Mohammed, who was merely Allah's conduit. The true speaker, they wish to point out, is "God Almighty - not Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him...." ("Human Rights Petition For: Civil Liberties Of Nasser Ahmed. In Camera." Washington, DC: Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, n.a., 1996.)
"27 military campaigns," Sarwat Saulat, The Life of the Prophet, p. 100.
"He personally led nine of them." D.S. Roberts, Islam: A Concise Introduction, p. 42.
. The idea of permanent warfare between the Moslem world and the non-Moslem world is so deeply ingrained that the phrase for the non-Moslem regions of the planet-- Dar al-Harb-- literally means "The Home of War." (Basil Davidson, Africa In History, p. 219.)
. D.S. Roberts, Islam: A Concise Introduction, pp. 42-43. The
interpretation cited as nearly universal by Roberts is probably derived from verses 191-193 of the Koranic chapter Al-Baqara, whose passages say, "slay them wherever ye catch them and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; ... Such is the reward of those who suppress faith. ...And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith in Allah." "Justice," in the eyes of many ancient and modern Moslems, means the imposition of Koranic law. "Faith" is understood to be faith in Islam. Hence the passage, in the eyes of many, instructs the pious to use slaughter to impose Koranic law and Islam, since slaughter is preferable to the continuance of non-Islamic codes and beliefs ("tumult and oppression").
. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, pp. 141-142.
. The Qu'ran, "Al-Baqara"--sura 25.
. The Qu'ran, "Al-Baqara"--sura 42.
. The Qu'ran, "Al-Baqara"--sura 83.
. A Moslem cleric rises through five grades of rank in his career. He starts out as a talib ilm--a student. He moves on to mujitahid--a person capable of arriving at an opinion. Then a mubelleg al-risala--"a carrier of the message;" a hojat al-Islam--an "authority on Islam;" and ayatollah--a "sign of God." The final, and ultimate level of authority is ayatollah al-uzma-- "great sign of god." (Mohammed Heikal, The Return of the Ayatollah, p. 83.)
. Ayatollah Khomeini, Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini, p. 4. For similar statements to this and to those that follow, see Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, Hamid Algar, trans., pp. 327, 34, 48, 286, 287. See also Shaul Bakash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, p. 234.

. Ayatollah Khomeini, Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini, p. 51. Some western Islamic scholars are intent on "correcting" what they perceive as an undeserved negative image of Islam. They claim that the "believers in God's partners" so often accursed by Mohammed are "pagans" and not Christians. These savants point out quite validly that the Koran says: "Those who believe (in the Qur'an) and those who follow the Jewish (Scriptures) and the Christians and the Sabeans and who believe in Allah and the last day and work righteousness shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear nor shall they grieve." (Al-Baqara--62) The apologists then ignore literally dozens of passages like the following: "The Jews call Uzair a son of Allah and the Christians call Christ the son of Allah. That is a saying from their mouths; (in this) they but imitate what the unbelievers of old used to say. Allah's curse be on them...." (At-Tauba--30); "O ye who believe! take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors...Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust." (Al-Maida--51). Most important, the Koran is explicit in its pronouncement that Christians are, indeed, "those who believe in God's partners":

They do blaspheme who say: "Allah is Christ the son of Mary." But said Christ: "O children of Israel! worship Allah my Lord and your Lord." Whoever joins other gods with Allah Allah will forbid him the garden and the Fire will be his abode. There will for the wrong-doers be no one to help. (Al-Maida--72)

They do blaspheme who say: Allah is one of three in a Trinity: for there is no god except One Allah. If they desist not from their word (of blasphemy) verily a grievous penalty will befall the blasphemers among them. (Al-Maida--73)

. Shaul Bakash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, p. 233. As R.K. Ramazani, the Harry Flood Byrd, Jr. professor of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, put it, "Khomeini believes that the export of revolution is obligatory" in the interests of "an overarching concept of Islamic world order." Ramazani pointed out that Khomeini "rejected...the very idea of the [secular, non-Islamic] nation-state.... In other words, in Khomeini's ideal Islamic world order there would be no room for the modern secular... international system." Khomeini, in Ramazani's words, felt "it is Iran that is uniquely qualified as a nation to pave the way for the ultimate founding of world government.... In Khomeini's words, '...the Iranian nation must grow in power and resolution until it has vouchsafed Islam to the entire world.'" (R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Respect in the Middle East, pp. 20-24.)

. Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, Hamid Algar trans., Mizan Press, Berkeley, California, 1981, pp. 35, 219. Khomeini's view of Christ may become a little clearer if you realize that standard Islamic doctrine asserts the Old and New Testament are insidious corruptions of God's word, and that these perversions were later "corrected" by the Koran.
. Mark Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, America and the World, Winter, 1991-1992, p. 70. For additional information on the progress of Islamic Fundamentalism, see: "Islam Resumes Its March," by the editors of The Economist, reprinted in The National Times, May 1992, p. 9.
. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: myth or reality, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p. 8.
. Daniel Platlea, "Islamic Fever--Too Hot For Churches," Insight, January 22, 1990, p. 34. "The Fight For African Souls," reprinted from Der Spiegel, Hamburg, Germany, in World Press Review, June 1992, p. 48.

. Dr. Raphael Danziger, Joel Himelfarb, Mindy Weisenberg, "Schwarz 'Optimistic' On South Africa's Prospects," Near East Report, August 3, 1992, p. 146.
. Robert R. McMillan, publisher of Long Island Economic Times, in Caucus Current, "Do You Have a Stamp of Israel in Your Passport May 1992," P. 28.
. Andrew Giarelli, "Regional Reports: Asia\Pacific," World Press Review, June 1992, p. 34. The Sinkiang region commands fully a sixth of China's territory and is the source of most of the nation's oil and precious metals. As recently as the 19th Century Moslem uprisings devastated China's Sinkiang and Yunnan sections. The Sinkiang revolt of 1875 temporarily tore the province from Chinese control. The eighteen-year-long Yunnan rising resulted in the deaths of a million people and the near depopulation of the territory's main cities. (Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China, pp. 301, 304. E.N. Anderson, The Food of China, p. 131.) In the late 1980s, despite the repressive policies of the Chinese Communist government, Islamic religious leaders in Sinkiang--inspired by Teheran--were once again challenging "the authority of the secular state." (Robert Delfs, "China's Unruly Minorities," Far Eastern Economic Review, reprinted in World Press Review, December, 1988, p. 40.) And in the '90s, things had gotten worse.
. Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/91, pp. 59-73.
. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: myth or reality-, pp. 11, 12, 23, 203, 206. "Spread of Islamic Rules," Asiaweek, Hong Kong, reprinted in World Press Review, November 1992, p. 50.
. Barry Shelby, "Secessions," summarized from Asiaweek, Hong Kong, in World Press Review, November 1993, p. 5.
. Steven A. Holmes, "Iran's Shadow: Fundamentalism Alters the Mideast's Power Relationships," The New York Times, August 22, 1993, Section 4, p. 1.
. According to the United Nations International Labor Organization, heavily-armed Islamic militias ship black Sudanese men to agricultural forced labor camps, then send desirable women and children north--tied to each other by ropes around their necks--to become involuntary housekeepers and concubines. Meanwhile, Sudan keeps these activities quiet in the American media through the high-priced efforts of Washington lobbying firm Pagonis & Donnelly. (Ward Johnson, "Sudanese Government Wars With Populace," New York Times, April 3, 1993, p. 22.)
. Makram Muhammed Ahmed, "Algeria At the Brink," Al-Musawar, Cairo, in World Press Review, September, 1991, p. 34. Jacques Girardon, "A Veiled Future For Algeria: fundamentalist power gives rise to uncertainty," L'Express, Paris, and "Will Algeria Become a Second Iran?" Der Spiegel, Hamburg, Germany, both in World Press Review, August, 1990, pp. 32-33.

. Stanley Reed, "Jordan And The Gulf Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990-1991, p. 28.
. Phebe Marr, "The Islamic Revival: Security Issues," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1992, p. 37.
. Ken Kraven, "The Real Face of Kuwait," Washington Post, reprinted in The National Times, November 1992, p. 2.
. Bruce C. McKenna, "The Subcontinental Blues," National Review, May 27, 1991, pp. 21-22.
. Yalman Onaran, "Islamic Revival in Central Asia," Near East Report, August 31, 1992, p. 166.
. Alan Riding, "France, Reversing Course, Fights Immigrants Refusal to Be French," The New York Times, December 5, 1993, pp. 1, 14. "...alienated young men, who feel particular resentment that they have not found a place in French society, are the principle targets of recruitment by Islamic fundamentalists. 'I'm worried about the fundamentalists because police don't go into suburbs rampant with crime and drugs,' Amina [a Tunisian-born French singer] said."
. "Islamic fundamentalism in the Balkans...constitutes a direct threat to European peace." Ioannis M Varitsiotes, "Security in the Mediterranean and the Balkans," Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1992, p. 25-34. Varitsiotes is Defense Minister of Greece. For the historical background of Islam in the Balkans, see Francis Dvornik, The Slavs in European History and Civilization, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1962. Dragoljub R. Zivojinovic, "Islam In The Balkans: Origins and Contemporary Implications," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1992, pp. 51-61. Zivojinovic, a professor of history at the University of Belgrade, claims that "the ambitions of Islamic movements in the Balkans, notably in Bosnia-Hercegovina [are] threatening European and even global stability." Zivojinovic attempts to demonstrate that two books by Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic--Islamska deklaracia and Islam between East and West--are "an exposition of the political essence of fundamentalism and its outlook on the world..., an invitation to Muslims around the world to awaken and stand up in order to accomplish a historical duty for which they are predestined." Zivojinovic feels Izetbegovic 's expansionist pronouncements come "close to the ideas of the Ayatollah Khomeini...."
. For more on the rising threat of Islam, see: Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91, special issue of Foreign Affairs, pp. 23-33; Tim Weiner, "Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield," New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1994, pp. 53-5. And for the Islamic world's almost universal embrace of a fundamentalism tainted heavily by hatred of the U.S. after the 1991 Iraqi-American War, see Eqbal Ahmad, "A Tug of War For Muslim's Allegiance: Fundamentalist currents vie for ascendancy," New Statesman and Society, London, in World Press Review, November, 1991, pp. 24-25.

. Islam is the fastest-expanding religion in the Afro-American community, with over a million Black American adherents.(Ari L. Goldman, "Mainstream Islam Rapidly Embraced by Black Americans," The New York Times, February 21, 1989, pp. 1 and B4.) Funds from countries like Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia have made much of this expansion possible. In 1977, for example, three Saudi princes decided to funnel fifty million dollars into American Black neighborhoods. But there would be a price. When Saudi Arabia sponsored a Black American Business Conference at L.A.'s Century Plaza Hotel in 1979, Gerald E. Gray, head of the Pan American Steel Corporation, gave the 600 Afro-American entrepreneurs assembled for the event the following advice. To get more Arab money, he said, blacks need to "establish some non-economic relationships [with Islamic interests].... When Arabs attempted to boycott companies, we didn't say anything in their support. When Arabs were accused of creating inflation by raising the price of oil, we had a chance to articulate their position. ...we're going to have to be their voice in this country if we expect them to participate in business with us." (Steven Emerson, The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection, Franklin Watts, New York, 1985, pp. 73-74.) For an indication of the manner in which Islamic groups have overcome the barriers erected between church and state to run "Islamic cultural programs" in inner city public schools, see Michael Daly, "Pal saw the route of all evil in sheik," New York Daily News, March 23, 1993, pp. 8, 18.

. Yehudit Barsky, Al-Fuqra: Holy Warriors of Terrorism, Anti-Defamation League, New York, 1993, p. 1.
. Olivier Michel, "Allah's GI's," Le Figaro, Paris, reprinted in World Press Review, September 1992, pp. 40-41.
. The Sword of Islam, Granada TV.

. "Islam," Smithsonian World.

. For attempted Iranian inroads into the Central Asian Republics, see: Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, p. 108; Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy and the West," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, p.131; Bernard LeCompte, "Communism Confronts Islam," L'Express, Paris, reprinted in World Press Review, July 1992, p. 10; Boris and Eugene Rumer, "Who Will Be the Next Yugoslavia," World Monitor, November 1992, p. 37; Edward Mortimer, "New Ism in the East," World Monitor, September 1992, p. 50; and Haroon Siddiqui, "The Scramble For Central Asia; A global contest for hearts, minds, money," Toronto Star, reprinted in World Press Review, July 1992, p. 10.
. Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1984, p. 107.
. Shibley Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War," Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1993, p. 443.
. Richard Mackenzie, "Pitfalls in Policy on the Path to Kabul," Insight, April 9, 1990, p. 11.

. Roger Draper, "Visions of Turkey," World Press Review, May, 1990, p. 44.

. The Sword of Islam, Granada TV.

. "Islam," Smithsonian World, Program 305, Steve York, producer/director, Adrian Malone, executive producer, Sandra W. Bradley, senior producer, Michael Olmert, writer, co-produced by The Smithsonian Institution and WETA, Washington, D.C., first aired July 22, 1987.
. "Islam," Smithsonian World.
. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Islamic World, W.W. Norton, N.Y., 1993. Note also the following statement from Hisham Sharabi, Professor of European Intellectual History, Omar al-Mukhtar Professor of Arab Culture at Georgetown University, and one of the Arab/American community's most influential secular intellectual leaders: "the secularists' opposition to Islamic fundamentalism does not make them, as some Western observers seem to think, potentially objective allies of the West in its fight against Islamic fundamentalism. In the secularists' view Western hostility to Islamic fundamentalism, like its hostility to Arab nationalism, stems... from imperialist interests and hegemonic goals which the secularist intellectuals alongside the Muslim fundamentalists are unconditionally committed to oppose." Hisham Sharabi, "Modernity and Islamic Revival: The Central Task of Arab Intellectuals," Contention, Fall 1992, pp. 127-137.
. The Sword of Islam, David Darlow, producer/director, Brian Park and Fiona Moffitt, research, Rod Caird, executive producer, Granada TV, Manchester, England, 1987. This extraordinary documentary, one of the few to probe the hostile world of Islamic fundamentalism, was the result of an eighteen-month investigation in Beirut, Cairo and Iran.

. Abdul Aziz Said, "Islamic Fundamentalism and the West," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1992, pp. 21-36.
. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: myth or reality, pp. 173, 181.
. Edward W. Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," The New York Times Magazine, November 21, 1993, p. 62.
. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: myth or reality, p. 171.
. Phebe Marr, "The Islamic Revival: Security Issues," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1992, pp. 37, 43-44.
. Abbas Hamdani, "Islamic Fundamentalism," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1993, pp. 38, 44.
. Ayatollah Khomeini, Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini: Political, Philosophical, Social, and Religious, pp. 3-7, 27-28, 31.
. As long ago as 1983, the Chinese had sold Moslem Pakistan the technology for building atomic bombs the size of soccer balls. Pakistan, in turn, had built facilities for mass-producing these weapons and was fully equipped with the ballistic missiles to deliver them. (John Dikkenburg, "'Supermarket' in the Pacific," Asia Magazine, Hong Kong, reprinted in World Press Review, September, 1992, pp. 14-16.) By 1993, there were active nuclear weapons development programs in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and several other Islamic states. According to Harvard University's Samuel P. Huntington, "a top Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons...." (Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993, p. 46.)

Excerpted from The Lucifer Principle:
A Scientific Expedition Into The Forces of History.
To order The Lucifer Principle from Amazon.com, click here

9

for more on the dangers of
21st Century extremists
order
Global Brain
The Evolution of Mass Mind From the Big Bang
to the 21st Century

howardbloom.net home

Buy How I Accidentally Started The Sixties at an unbelievably low price from Amazon.com